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We provide results on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamically incomplete
financial markets in discrete time. Our framework allows for heterogeneous agents, unspanned
random endowments and convex trading constraints. In the special case where all agents have
preferences of the same type and all random endowments are replicable by trading in the financial
market we show that a one-fund theorem holds and give an explicit expression for the equilibrium
pricing kernel. If the underlying noise is generated by finitely many Bernoulli random walks, the
equilibrium dynamics can be described by a system of coupled backward stochastic difference
equations, which in the continuous-time limit becomes a multi-dimensional backward stochastic
differential equation. If the market is complete in equilibrium, the system of equations decouples,
but if not, one needs to keep track of the prices and continuation values of all agents to solve it.
As an example we simulate option prices in the presence of stochastic volatility, demand pressure
and short-selling constraints.
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1
1 Introduction
We consider an equilibrium framework to price financial securities in dynamically incomplete
markets in discrete time. Our main interest is in equilibrium prices of derivatives or structured
products with maturities T that are short compared to the time horizon of a typical life-time
consumption-investment problem. So the risk of fluctuating interest rates does not play a big
role, and we assume them to be exogenously given. We suppose our agents invest in the financial
market with the goal of optimizing the utility of their wealth at time T . Our setup is flexi-
ble enough to accommodate heterogeneous agents, unspanned random endowments and convex
trading constraints. In dynamic models with general preferences, several consumption goods and
incomplete security markets an equilibrium does not always exist, and if there is one, it is typically
not unique. For an overview of equilibria with incomplete markets we refer to the review arti-
cles by Geanakoplos (1990) and Magill and Shafer (1991) or the textbook by Magill and Quinzii
(1996).
In this paper money is the only consumption good and all agents are assumed to have trans-
lation invariant preferences that are updated in a time-consistent way as new information is
becoming available. This allows us to prove existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under
general assumptions by backward induction. Typical examples of translation invariant prefer-
ences are those induced by expected exponential utility, the monotone mean-variance preferences
of Maccheroni et al. (2009), mean-risk type preferences where risk is measured with a convex risk
measure, optimized certainty equivalents à la Ben-Tal and Teboulle (1986, 1987) or the divergence
utilities of Cherny and Kupper (2009). The assumption of translation invariant preferences is ap-
propriate if, for instance, agents are understood as banks or insurance companies which evaluate
investments in terms of expected values and risk capital, that is, buffer capital that needs to be
held to make an investment acceptable from a risk management point of view. Recently, Gârleanu
et al. (2009) have modelled option dealers as expected exponential utility maximizers to describe
the effects of demand pressure on options prices, and in Carmona et al. (2010) equilibrium prices
for emission certificates have been studied under linear preferences. We assume there exist two
kinds of assets. The first type of assets are liquidly traded in large volumes and their prices are
not affected by the actions of our agents. Their dynamics will be exogenously given. Assets of the
second kind entitle their holders to an uncertain payoff at time T . We think of them as derivatives
or structured products which can also depend on non-financial risk such as temperature, rain or
political events. They exist in fixed supply and are only traded by our agents. The goal is to price
them by matching demand and supply. The situation where there are no exogenous instruments
and all assets are priced in equilibrium is a special case. If assets of the second kind are issued by
our agents and not bought by anybody else, they exist in zero net supply. On the other hand, if
they are originated outside of our group of traders, they are in positive net supply. An example
would be CO2-emission certificates designed and issued but not traded by the European Union.
Similarly, if there is demand for them from outside of our group of traders, they will be in negative
net supply. An example will be discussed in Subsection 5.2 below where end users are buying put
options from a group of option dealers.
The standard way to price derivatives is to compute the expectation of their discounted payoffs
under an equivalent martingale measure Q, that is, Q has the same null sets as the reference mea-
sure P and the discounted price of the underlying is a martingale (or local martingale) with respect
to Q. Binomial tree models and the standard Black–Scholes model are complete, and there is
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exactly one equivalent martingale measure. But extensions such as trinomial tree, GARCH-type,
stochastic volatility or jump-diffusion models are incomplete and admit infinitely many equivalent
martingale measures. The question then is, which one should be used for pricing. In practice,
models are often built directly under Q, then calibrated to market prices of liquidly traded options
and used to value more exotic ones; see for instance, Lipton (2002) for an overview of popular
stochastic volatility models. Some pricing measures that have been discussed in the literature
are the minimal martingale measure of Föllmer and Schweizer (1991), the Esscher transformed
measure proposed by Gerber and Shiu (1994), the variance-optimal martingale measure studied in
Schweizer (1995, 1996) and Delbaen and Schachermayer (1996) or the minimal entropy martingale
measure of Frittelli (2000). Recently, several authors have applied utility indifference arguments
to the valuation of complex financial products; see for instance, Henderson and Hobson (2009) for
an overview. But utility indifference prices are personal, reflecting the risk preferences of a single
agent. Our approach provides a way of deriving the pricing rule from equilibrium considerations.
We will show that if at least one agent has differentiable preferences and open trading constraints,
then our pricing method is given by a probability measure Q that is absolutely continuous with
respect to P. If in addition, the agent’s preference functional is strictly monotone, Q will be
equivalent to P. On the other hand, if agents have closed trading constraints, equilibrium prices
in our model are not necessarily given by a linear functional; see also Hugonnier (2010) and the
references therein for equilibrium models with constraints and rational asset pricing bubbles or
Avellaneda and Lipkin (2009) for a dynamic model of stock and option prices under short-selling
constraints.
Our method to prove existence of an equilibrium is to recursively construct one-time-step
representative agents with preferences over the space of financial gains realizable by investing
in the financial market. In every step we take a Negishi approach similar to Borch (1984) and
Filipović and Kupper (2008), where (constrained) Pareto optimal allocations and their relation to
equlibrium prices are studied in static models with uncertainty. Since we work with translation
invariant preferences, our one-time-step representative agents can be constructed as simple sup-
convolutions of the preference functionals of the single agents. But due to market incompleteness
and trading constraints, optimal allocations have to be found in suitably restricted subsets. The
consumption sets in our framework are unbounded from below. To guarantee the existence of
an equilibrium we assume that each agent either is sensitive to large losses or has conditionally
compact trading constraints. Sensitivity to large losses means that a position which will be
negative in some states of the world is becoming unacceptable if it is multiplied with a sufficiently
large constant, irrespective of its upside potential (a precise definition is given in Subsection 2.3
below). Our argument is based on the fact that for an agent which is sensitive to large losses,
it is sufficient to search for optimal one-time-step strategies in conditionally compact sets. For
different conditions and concepts of compactness in equilibrium models with consumption sets
that are unbounded from below, we refer to Werner (1987), Cheng (1991), Brown and Werner
(1995), Dana et al. (1997, 1999) and the references therein. Duffie (1987) has shown the existence
of an equilibrium in in a model with complete spot markets and an incomplete market of purely
financial securities. The proof is based on a fixed point argument and in general, his equilibrium
is not unique. In Cuoco and He (2001) a static representative agent is constructed in an economy
with incomplete securities markets. But in that paper an equilibrium does not always exist and
the construction of the representative agent involves a sup-convolution of the single agents with
stochastic weights. Anthropelos and Z̆itković (2010) show existence and uniqueness in a setup
3
similar to ours. There are agents with translation invariant preferences who negotiate the price of
a bundle of contingent claims while they can invest in an incomplete market of exogenously given
financial securities. But in contrast to our model, they only consider static investments in the
contingent claims. Jofre et al. (2010) provide results on the existence of equilibrium in general
models with incomplete market and money.
If uncertainty is generated by a finite event tree, our arguments can be carried out with
standard finite-dimensional convex duality arguments. In the case of a general probability space
we are confronted with infinite-dimensional spaces and need conditional analysis results from
Cheridito et al. (2011). If an equilibrium exists and in addition, at least one agent has differentiable
preferences and open constraints, we show that equilibrium prices are unique. To show uniqueness
of the agents’ optimal trading gains one needs strict convexity assumptions on the preferences.
In the special case where all agents have preferences of the same type, for instance, expected
exponential utility with different risk aversions, and at the same time, all random endowments
are spanned by attainable trading gains, we show that a one-fund theorem holds. Under an
additional differentiability assumption on the preferences, the equilibrium pricing kernel can be
given in explicit form. If there are exogenous assets, the pricing kernel contains optimal trading
gains from investing in them. Otherwise, similar to the standard CAPM, it just consists of the
gradient of the base preference functional at the point corresponding to the sum of aggregate
endowment and total supply of the financial assets. As an example we study the effects of
stochastic volatility, demand pressure and short-selling constraints on prices of options on single
stocks and indexes.
If the underlying noise is generated by finitely many Bernoulli random walks we show how
equilibrium prices and optimal strategies can be obtained by solving a system of coupled BS∆Es
(backward stochastic difference equations). This part of our work is related to Dumas and Lyasoff
(2009), where under the assumption that an incomplete-market equilibrium exists, a method is
developed to recursively compute it from first order conditions. In the continuous-time limit our
system of BS∆Es becomes a multi-dimensional BSDE (backward stochastic differential equation).
If the market turns out to be complete in equilibrium, both our systems of BS∆Es and BSDEs
decouple. Conditions that guarantee market completeness in equilibrium have been studied in
various frameworks; see for instance, Magill and Shafer (1990), Horst and Müller (2007), An-
derson and Raimondo (2009) or Horst et al. (2010). However, if the market is incomplete in
equilibrium, our equations do not decouple, and to solve it one has to keep track of the prices and
the continuation values of all agents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the ingredients
for our model together with the notation. In Section 3 we give a convex dual characterization of
equilibrium and use it to show existence. In Section 4 we prove uniqueness of equilibrium prices
if preferences are differentiable and uniqueness of optimal wealth dynamics if they satisfy a strict
convexity property. Section 5 provides a one-fund theorem for the special case where agents have
preferences of the same type and random endowments are replicable by trading in the financial
market. As an application we discuss the effects of stochastic volatility, demand pressure and
short-selling constraints on option prices. In Section 6 we assume that the noise is generated by
finitely many Bernoulli random walks and characterize the equilibrium dynamics in terms of a
coupled system of BS∆Es. All proofs are given in the appendix.
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2 Notation and setup
We consider a finite group of agents A who trade in a financial market. Time is discrete and
runs through the set {0, 1, ..., T}. Uncertainty is modeled by a probability space (Ω,F ,P). The
flow of information is described by a filtration (Ft)Tt=0. We assume that at time t, all agents
have access to the information represented by Ft and all events in F0 have probability 0 or 1.
P is a reference probability measures that does not necessarily reflect the beliefs of our agents.
But we assume they all agree that an event A ∈ F is impossible if P[A] = 0. L0(Ft) denotes
the set of all Ft-measurable random variables and L∞(Ft) the set of essentially bounded random
variables, where random variables are identified if they are equal P-almost surely. Accordingly,
all equalities and inequalities between random variables will be understood in the P-almost sure
sense. Expectation with respect to P is denoted by E. Notation for expectations with respect to
other probability measures will be introduced where it is needed. Each agent a ∈ A is initially
endowed with an uncertain payoff Ha ∈ L0(FT ) that is bounded from below. In the special case
where the sample space Ω is finite, all random variables are bounded and the filtration (Ft) can
be thought of as an event tree.
2.1 The financial market
All agents can lend funds to and borrow from a money market account at the same exogenously
given interest rate and invest in a financial market consisting of J +K assets. We use the money
market as numeraire, that is, all prices will be expressed in terms of the value of one dollar invested
in the money market at time 0. The prices of the first J assets are exogenously given by a J-
dimensional bounded adapted process (Rt)Tt=0. Our agents can buy and sell arbitrary quantities
of them without influencing their prices. The prices of the other K assets will be determined
endogenously by supply and demand. The k-th of them exists in net supply nk ∈ R and yields
a payoff of Sk ∈ L∞(FT ) per share at the final time T . Our goal is to find equilibrium price
processes (Skt )
T
t=0 satisfying the terminal conditions S
k
T = S
k together with optimal investment
strategies for all agents a ∈ A. By n ∈ RK we denote the vector with components nk and (St)
is the K-dimensional process with components (Skt ). In the special case J = 0, the prices of
all assets are determined by supply and demand. The possibility to include exogenously given
assets in the model is helpful for the study of derivatives and structured products. For instance a
weather derivative might only be traded by an insurance company and a few end users. They can
also invest in large cap stocks. But while their demands will determine the price of the weather
derivative, they are too small to influence the stock prices.
A trading strategy for agent a ∈ A is given by an RJ+K-valued predictable stochastic process
(ϑat )
T
t=1, that is, ϑ
a
t is measurable with respect to Ft−1. By ϑ
a,R
t we denote the first J components
of ϑat . They describe how many shares of the assets R
1
, . . . , R
J agent a is holding from time t− 1
to t. ϑa,St are the remaining K components of ϑ
a
t and model agent a’s investments in the assets
S
1
, . . . , S
K . The part of agent a’s time t− 1 wealth not invested in the financial assets is kept in
the money market account. Since all prices are expressed in discounted terms, investments in the






























t − Skt−1. We suppose there is no consumption
or infusion of funds at intermediate times. So a strategy (ϑat )
T







t ·∆Rt + ϑ
a,S
t ·∆St.
We assume that the R-assets satisfy the following no-arbitrage condition:
(NA) No arbitrage in the R-assets: For every predictable trading strategy (ϑt)Tt=1 in the R-
assets one has that
T￿
t=1
ϑt ·∆Rt ≥ 0 implies
T￿
t=1
ϑt ·∆Rt = 0.
By the Dalang–Morton–Willinger theorem (see Dalang et al., 1990) this is equivalent to the






for all j and t.
2.2 Trading constraints
We suppose that our agents face trading constraints described by sets Cat+1 of admissible one-step
strategies ϑt+1 ∈ L0(Ft)J+K satisfying the following two conditions:





(C2) λϑt+1 + (1− λ)ϑ￿t+1 ∈ Cat+1 for all ϑt+1,ϑ￿t+1 ∈ Cat+1 and λ ∈ L0(Ft) such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Condition (C1) guarantees that there exists at least one admissible trading strategy for each
agent such that aggregate demand is equal to supply. For example, condition (C1) is fulfilled if
the S-assets exist in zero net supply and for all agents it is admissible to just keep their funds
in the money market account. (C2) is a conditional convexity condition which will be needed
in our proof that an equilibrium exists. In the case Cat+1 = L
0(Ft)J+K , we say that agent a is
unconstrained at time t.







and say Cat+1 is Ft-bounded if there exists an Ft-measurable random variable Y such that ||x||Ft ≤
Y for all x ∈ Cat+1. Similarly, we call Cat+1 Ft-open if for every x ∈ Cat+1 there exists an Ft-
measurable random variable ε > 0 such that x￿ ∈ Cat+1 for all x￿ ∈ L0(Ft)J+K satisfying ||x￿ −
x||Ft ≤ ε. We say Cat+1 is sequentially closed if it contains every x that is an almost sure limit of
a sequence of elements in Cat+1.
1
2.3 Translation-invariant preferences





0(FT ) → L0(Ft),
1Note that sequentially closed sets are not complements of Ft-open sets.
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where L0(Ft) denotes the set of all Ft-measurable random variables with values in R ∪ {−∞}.
Usually, preference functionals take values in R. But our agents update their preferences as they
learn about information contained in Ft. So their utilities at time t are Ft-measurable, and
allowing Uat to take values in L
0(Ft) instead of L0(Ft) allows for more interesting examples; see
Examples 2.1 below. We will also need the larger sets L̄0(Ft) of Ft-measurable random variables
with values in R ∪ {±∞}.
We assume that Uat has the following properties:
(N) Normalization: Uat (0) = 0
(M) Monotonicity: Uat (X) ≥ Uat (Y ) for all X,Y ∈ L0(FT ) such that X ≥ Y
(C) Ft-Concavity: Uat (λX + (1 − λ)Y ) ≥ λUat (X) + (1 − λ)Uat (Y ) for all X,Y ∈ L0(FT ) and
λ ∈ L0(Ft) such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, where 0(−∞) is understood to be 0
(T) Translation property: Uat (X + Y ) = U
a
t (X) + Y for all X ∈ L0(FT ) and Y ∈ L0(Ft)
Every preference functional Ut : L0(FT ) → L0(Ft) satisfying Ut(0) ∈ L0(Ft) can be normalized
without changing the preference order by passing to Ut(X)−Ut(0). So one can assume (N) without
loss of generality as soon as Uat (X) > −∞. The monotonicity assumption (M) is standard. It
just means that more is preferred to less. Condition (C) is an extension of ordinary concavity to
a situation where agents make decisions based on the information contained in Ft.2 Condition
(T) means that our preference orders are invariant under a shift of random payoffs by certain
amounts of cash. We need this assumption in our proof that an equilibrium exists. It is for
instance satisfied by the certainty equivalent of expected exponential utility or mean-risk type
preferences, and it covers the case of professional investors which maximize expectation under
constraints on the amount of risk they are allowed to take; specific cases of preference functionals
with the translation property (T) are discussed in Example 2.1 below.
Note that it follows from condition (C) that Uat has the following local property:
1AU
a
t (X) = 1AU
a
t (Y ) for all X,Y ∈ L0(FT ) and A ∈ Ft such that 1AX = 1AY. (2.1)
Indeed, due to (C), one has 1AUat (X) = 1AU
a
t (1AY + 1AcX) ≥ 1AUat (Y ) and by symmetry,
1AUat (X) ≤ 1AUat (Y ). That is, in the event A, the utility Ut(X) only depends on values X can
attain in states of the world contained in A.
In addition to (N), (M), (C) and (T) we also assume that the preferences are time-consistent
in the following sense:
(TC) Time-consistency: For all X,Y ∈ L0(FT ) and t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
U
a
t+1(X) ≥ Uat+1(Y ) implies Uat (X) ≥ Uat (Y ). (2.2)








X ∈ L0(FT ) : Uat+1(X) ∈ L0(Ft+1)
￿
.
2Convex preferences correspond to quasi-concave preference functionals. However, quasi-concavity and the
translation property (T) imply concavity; see Lemma 2.1 in Cheridito and Kupper (2009).
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Applying (2.2) to the random variable Y = Uat+1(X) shows that time-consistency implies the
following recursive structure of the preference functionals:
U
a




t+1(X)) for all t = 0, ..., T − 1 and X ∈ domUat+1. (2.3)
For some of the results in this paper we will also need the preferences to satisfy one or more
of the following conditions:
(SL) Sensitivity to large losses: limλ→∞ Ua0 (λX) = −∞ for all X ∈ L0(FT ) with the prop-
erty P[X < 0] > 0.
(SM) Strict monotonicity: Ua0 (X) > U
a
0 (Y ) for all X,Y ∈ domUa0 such that X ≥ Y and
P[X > Y ] > 0.
(SC) Strict concavity modulo translation: Ua0 (λX + (1− λ)Y ) > λUa0 (X) + (1− λ)Ua0 (Y )
for all λ ∈ R with 0 < λ < 1 and X,Y ∈ domUa0 such that X − Y is not constant.
For example, we will prove that an equilibrium exists if all agents have sequentially closed
trading constraints and either are sensitive to large losses or at every time t, the their constraints
are Ft-bounded. Furthermore, we will show that if the market is in equilibrium and at least one
agent has Ft-open constraints and strictly monotone preferences, then there exists an equilibrium
pricing measure Q equivalent to P. In Section 4 we show that equilibrium prices are unique if
at least one agent has differentiable preferences and Ft-open trading constraints. Moreover, we
show that in equilibrium the optimal trading gains of all agents satisfying (SC) are unique. Note
that since the functionals Ua0 have the translation property (T), they cannot be strictly concave
under translations by constants. But condition (SC) will be sufficient for our purposes.
Examples 2.1
1. Entropic preference functionals
The standard example of preference functionals satisfying (N), (M), (C), (T), (TC) is given by the




t (X) = −
1
γ
logE [exp(−γX) | Ft] for a constant γ > 0. (2.4)
They induce the same preferences as the conditional expected exponential utilities E [exp(−γX) | Ft].
But only in the form (2.4) do they have the translation property (T). Ua0 also satisfies (SL), (SM)
and (SC). (SL) and (SM) are obvious. (SC) follows from Theorem 5.3 in Cheridito and Li (2009).
2. Pasting together one-step preference functionals
A general method of constructing time-consistent preference functionals in discrete time is by
pasting together one-step preference functionals. Assume, for instance, that
vt : L
∞(Ft+1) → L∞(Ft), t = 0, . . . , T − 1,





vt((X ∧ n) ∨m) map L0(Ft+1) to L0(Ft). (2.5)
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(general conditions for this to be true are given in Cheridito et al., 2006). In Example 5 below
we provide a wide class of functionals for which it can be shown directly that (2.5) holds. Then
the compositions
Ut(X) = Vt ◦ · · · ◦ VT−1(X), X ∈ L0(FT ) (2.6)
inherit (N), (M), (C), (T) and are automatically time-consistent.
In the sequel we give some specific examples of one-step preference functionals vt : L∞(Ft+1) →
L
∞(Ft).
3. Monotone mean-variance preferences
Standard conditional mean variance




fulfills (N), (C), (T) but not the monotonicity property (M); see for instance, Maccheroni et al.
(2009). This can be corrected by slightly modifying its dual representation. For X ∈ L∞(F1),






















Xξ +Gλ(ξ) | Ft
￿




ξ ∈ L1(Ft+1) : E [ξ | Ft] = 1
￿
and ess inf denotes the largest lower bound of a family of random variables with respect to the
P-almost sure order; see for instance, Proposition VI.1.1 of Neveu (1975). If one modifies (2.7) to










ξ ∈ L1(Ft+1) : ξ ≥ 0,E [ξ | Ft] = 1
￿
,
one obtains one-step preference functionals satisfying (N), (M), (C), (T). They belong to the class
of divergence utilities, which are shown to satisfy condition (2.5) in Example 5 below.
4. Mean-risk preferences
Instead of modifying mean-variance as in (2.8), one can also replace the variance term by a convex
risk measure and set
vt(X) = λE [X | Ft]− (1− λ)ρt(X), (2.9)
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where λ is a number in (0, 1) and
ρt : L
∞(Ft+1) → L∞(Ft)
a normalized conditional convex risk measure, that is, −ρt satisfies (N), (M), (C) and (T); see
Föllmer and Schied (2004) for an introduction to convex risk measures in a static framework and
Cheridito and Kupper (2009) for dynamic risk measures. Whether condition (2.5) holds depends
on ρ.
5. Divergence utilities
The monotone mean-variance preference functional (2.8) can be generalized by replacing the func-
tionGλ with a more general divergence functionG : R+ → R such that ess infξ∈Dt+1 E [G(ξ) | Ft] =
0. Then
vt(X) = ess inf
ξ∈Dt+1
E [Xξ +G(ξ) | Ft] , (2.10)




{s− E [H(s−X) | Ft]} (2.11)
are of this form (ess sup denotes the least upper bound of a family of random variables in the
P-almost sure order). For instance, if H is increasing and convex such that maxx∈R(x−H(x)) = 0,
then (2.11) is of the form (2.10) with
G(y) = H∗(y) = sup
x∈R
{xy −H(x)} .
E [G(ξ)] is an f-divergence after Csiszar (1967). In the special case G(x) = 1λx log(x) it is rela-
tive entropy and vt becomes the entropic preference functional of Example 2.1.1. Unconditional
functionals of the form (2.10) and (2.11) have, for instance, been studied in the papers Ben-Tal
and Teboulle (1987), Cheridito and Li (2009) or Cherny and Kupper (2009). It is shown in the





vt((X ∧ n) ∨m) satisfy (2.5) (2.12)
and that
U0 = V0 ◦ · · · ◦ VT−1 is sensitive to large losses. (2.13)
2.4 Definition of equilibrium
At every time t = 0, 1..., T − 1 the goal of each agent a ∈ A is to invest in such a way that




















































s ·∆Rs + ϑa,Ss ·∆Ss.













s ·∆Rs + ϑa,Ss ·∆Ss
￿
. (2.15)
We say the market is in equilibrium if the following holds:
Definition 2.2 An equilibrium consists of a bounded, RK-valued, adapted process (St)Tt=0 sat-
isfying the terminal condition ST = S together with admissible trading strategies (ϑ̂at )
T
t=1 for all






















s ·∆Rs + ϑa,Ss ·∆Ss
￿





t = n for all t = 1, . . . , T .
Remark 2.3 If Ua0 is strictly monotone, then individual optimality at all times t follows from





















s ·∆Rs + ϑa,Ss ·∆Ss
￿
(2.16)
for all admissible strategies (ϑas)
T
s=1. Indeed, let us assume to the contrary that (2.16) holds but























s ·∆Rs + ϑa,Ss ·∆Ss
￿




























































s ·∆Rs + ϑ̃a,Ss ·∆Ss
￿
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s , s = t+ 1, . . . , T . But this contradicts (2.16).
3 Dual characterization and existence of equilibrium
In complete markets, competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal and every Pareto optimal al-
location can be supported as an equilibrium by constructing a suitable representative agent.
A standard way of proving existence of an equilibrium in complete markets is therefore via a
representative agent. The specific choice of the representative agent typically depends on the
equilibrium to be supported and the proof involves complex fixed-point arguments. However, for
translation invariant preferences the situation turns out to be simpler, and we will be able to
take a representative agent approach to construct an equilibrium step by step going backwards in
time even if markets are incomplete. Assume that equilibrium prices St+1, ..., ST and admissible
trading strategies ϑ̂at+2, ..., ϑ̂
a
T for all agents a ∈ A have already been determined such that the
components of St+1, ..., ST are bounded. We then define the continuation value of agent a ∈ A at













s ·∆Rs + ϑ̂a,Ss ·∆Ss
￿
and HaT = H
a
. (3.1)
Since we assumed Ha to be bounded from below and there exist bounded admissible one-step























s ·∆Rs + ϑ̄a,Ss ·∆Ss
￿
≥ c.
In particular, Hat+1 belongs to L

















s ·∆Rs + ϑ̂a,Ss ·∆Ss
￿















The usual approach of defining a representative agent in a complete market framework would be
to pool all available resources and redistribute them in a socially optimal manner. But in our
model the agents cannot pool and redistribute resources arbitrarily. They can only exchange their
risk exposures by trading the financial assets. In addition, they are subject to trading constraints.
To account for that we construct a one-step representative agent at time t with preferences over
one-step gains that can be realized by taking admissible positions in the financial market. This
will allow us to construct equilibrium prices St, continuation valuesHat and optimal strategies ϑ̂
a
t+1
recursively from St+1 and Hat+1. Observe that agent a’s time-t utility from investing according to











We want to extend this to any ϑat+1 ∈ L0(Ft)J+K by setting it equal to −∞ for those ω ∈ Ω where













t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑ
a,S


















t+1) is the Ft-measurable function cat (ϑat+1) = ess supϑt+1∈Cat+1 1{ϑt+1=ϑat+1}. However,
at this point, St is not known yet. So we replace the increment ∆St+1 in (3.2) by St+1 and define
the mapping uat : L













t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑ
a,S
















The role of the one-step representative agent at time t will be played by the conditional sup-
convolution















, x ∈ L0(Ft)K . (3.4)
Note that if time-t equilibrium prices St exist, the replacement of (3.2) by (3.3) just results in a
shift of ût(x) by x · St, which changes the marginal utilities of the representative agent by St. If
∞−∞ is understood as −∞, the mapping ût : L0(Ft)K → L̄0(Ft) is Ft-concave. Moreover, since
the preference functionals of all agents have the local property (2.1), one has
1Aût(x) = 1Aût(y) for all x, y ∈ L0(Ft)K and A ∈ Ft such that 1Ax = 1Ay.
We define the conditional concave conjugate û∗t : L
0(Ft)K → L0(Ft) by
û
∗
t (y) = ess inf
x∈L0(Ft)K
{x · y − ût(x)}
and call a random vector y ∈ L0(Ft)K a conditional supergradient of ût at x ∈ L0(Ft)K if
ût(x) ∈ L0(Ft) and ût(x+ z)− ût(x) ≤ z · y for all z ∈ L0(Ft)K .
The conditional superdifferential ∂ût(x) is the set of all conditional supergradients of ût at x. As
in standard convex analysis, one has
ût(x) + û
∗
t (y) ≤ x · y for all x, y ∈ L0(Ft)K
with equality if and only if y ∈ ∂ût(x). With this notation we now are ready to give a dual
characterization of equilibrium:
Theorem 3.1 A bounded RK-valued adapted process (St)Tt=0 satisfying ST = S together with
admissible trading strategies (ϑ̂at )
T
t=1 for all agents a ∈ A form an equilibrium if and only if for
all times t = 0, . . . , T − 1 the following three conditions hold:









t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑ̂
a,S







In particular, if (i)–(iii) hold and ∂ût(n) = {St} for all t = 0, . . . , T −1, then (St)Tt=0 is the unique
equilibrium price process.
The characterization of equilibrium in Theorem 3.1 is reminiscent of the complete market
case: equilibrium prices correspond to marginal utilities of the representative agent. However,
the representative agent ût is only defined in directions spanned by attainable one-step trading
gains, and optimal trading strategies are only constrained Pareto optimal.
The following proposition shows that there exists an equilibrium pricing measure if at least
one of the agents has strictly monotone preferences and open trading constraints.
Proposition 3.2 If the market is in equilibrium and there exists at least one agent a ∈ A such
that Ua0 is strictly monotone and C
a
t+1 is Ft-open for all t ≤ T − 1, then there exists a probability
measure Q on (Ω,F) equivalent to P such that
Rt = EQ [RT | Ft] and St = EQ [ST | Ft] for all t = 0, . . . , T . (3.5)
To ensure existence of an equilibrium one needs assumptions on the preferences and trading
constraints which guarantee that at every time t, the one-step representative agent’s utility is finite
and attained. To motivate these assumptions, we give a simple example where an equilibrium
does not exist.
Example 3.3 Assume the probability space contains only finitely many elements {ω1, . . . ,ωN},
the time horizon is 1 and the preferences of the agents are given by expectations Ua0 (.) = Ea[.]
corresponding to probability measures Pa, a ∈ A. If there exist agents a, b ∈ A with no trading
constraints and a payoff Sk such that Ea[Sk] ￿= Eb[Sk], an equilibrium price for this payoff cannot
exist. Indeed, no matter how one chooses the initial price Sk0 ∈ R, at least one of the expectations






a + ϑa,R ·∆R1 + ϑa,S ·∆S1) ≥ Ea[Ha] + sup
ϑ∈R
Ea[ϑ∆Sk1 ] = ∞,
and there exists no optimal trading strategy for agent a.
Of course, if in Example 3.3, all agents have preferences given by EQ [.] for the same probability











, k = 1, . . . ,K, are











a + ϑ̄a,R ·∆R1 + ϑ̄a,S ·∆S1
￿
= EQ [Ha]
for all a ∈ A. That is, every trading strategy leads to the same utility, and all of them are optimal.
Another extreme case is when the agents have general preferences but for every agent a there
exists only one admissible trading strategy (ϑ̄at )
T
t=1. Then any process (St)
T
t=0 with bounded






t=1, a ∈ A, forms an equilibrium.
In the following theorem we give a general existence result. We say that the trading constraints
C
a





t+1 × · · ·×D
a,J × Ea,1t+1 × · · ·× E
a,K
t+1









Theorem 3.4 Assume that for all a ∈ A and t ≤ T − 1, Cat+1 factorizes and is sequentially
closed. If there exists a (possibly empty) subset A￿ ⊂ A such that
(i) Ua0 is sensitive to large losses for all a ∈ A￿ and
(ii) Cat+1 is Ft-bounded for all a ∈ A \ A￿ and t ≤ T − 1,
then an equilibrium exists.
Condition (ii) in Theorem 3.4 amounts to a conditional compactness assumption. Similarly,
it can be deduced from condition (i) that it is enough for agents to optimize over conditionally
compact sets in the strategy space. A full proof of the theorem is technical. We give it in the
appendix using conditional analysis results from Cheridito et al. (2011). Here we shortly sketch
the argument in a simple two-period model: Assume T = 1, J = 0, K = 1, and for all a ∈ A,
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If it can be shown that for all x ∈
￿
aC
a, the supremum in (3.6) is attained, û0 is a concave
function from R to R ∪ {−∞} and conditions (i)–(iii) of Theorem 3.1 hold. So an equilibrium
exists. But since all Ua0 have the translation property (T), the supremum in (3.6) is attained if











a(S − E [S])) (3.7)
is attained. In the special case S = E [S], this holds trivially. Otherwise, both sets {S − E [S] > 0}
and {S − E [S] < 0} have positive probability. So if for each a ∈ A, either Ua0 is sensitive to large








a(S − E [S])) (3.8)
for suitable compact intervals Ia ⊂ R. Since S is bounded, the mapping ϑa ￿→ Ua0 (ϑa(S − E [S]))
is continuous for every a ∈ A, and it follows that the supremum (3.8) is attained.
4 Differentiable preferences and uniqueness of equilibrium
In this section we introduce a differentiability condition on the preferences and give conditions
that guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium prices and optimal wealth dynamics. Condition (D) in
the following definition is a conditional version of Gâteaux-differentiability.
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Definition 4.1 We say that a preference functional Ut : L0(FT ) → L0(Ft) satisfies the differ-




Ut(X + Y/m)− Ut(X)
1/m
= E [Y Z | Ft] for all Y ∈ L∞(FT ). (4.1)
If such a random variable Z exists, it has to be unique and we denote it by ∇Ut(X). If for
X ∈ domUt ∩ L0(Ft+1), there exists a Z ∈ L1(Ft+1) such that (4.1) holds for all Y ∈ L∞(Ft+1),
it is also unique and we denote it by ∇̃Ut(X).
If for some random variable X ∈ L0(Ft+1) the gradient ∇Ut(X) exists, then so does ∇̃Ut(X),
and it is equal to
∇̃Ut(X) = E [∇Ut(X) | Ft+1] .
On the other hand, if U0, ..., UT−1 is a time-consistent family of preference functionals and there
is an X ∈ L0(FT ) such that ∇̃Ut(Ut+1(X)) exists for all t ≤ T − 1, then ∇Ut(X) exists too and





Proposition 4.2 Assume that for at least one agent a ∈ A, the preference functionals Uat satisfy
(D) and the sets Cat+1 are Ft-open for all t ≤ T − 1. Then there exists at most one equilibrium












s ·∆Rs + ϑ̂a,Ss ·∆Ss
￿
(4.3)
defines a probability measure Qat on (Ω,F) such that Qat |Ft= P |Ft and
Rt = EQat [RT | Ft] , St = EQat [ST | Ft] . (4.4)
If in addition, Ua0 is strictly monotone, then Qa := Qa0 is equivalent to P and one has,
Rt = EQa [RT | Ft] and St = EQa [ST | Ft] for all t. (4.5)
Remark 4.3 If under the assumptions of Proposition 4.2 an equilibrium exists but the preference
functional Ua0 is not strictly monotone, one can still write
Rt = EQa [RT | Ft] and St = EQa [ST | Ft] Qa-almost surely. (4.6)
But Qa might not be equivalent to P and it can happen that there exists an event A ∈ Ft such
that P[A] > 0 and Q[A] = 0. (4.6) then does not give any information about Rt and St in the
event A. So (4.6) is weaker than (4.4). On the other hand, if Qa is equivalent to P, then (4.4)
and (4.6) are equivalent.
Since we made no assumptions on non-redundancy of the financial assets, we cannot say





t, then any investment in R1 can arbitrarily be replaced by one in R2. However, if equilibrium
prices are unique and Ua0 is strictly concave modulo translation, it can be shown that the optimal
one-step trading gains of the corresponding agent are unique.
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Proposition 4.4 If there exists a unique equilibrium price process (St)Tt=0 and U
a
0 is strictly
concave modulo translation for some agent a ∈ A, then the optimal one-step trading gains
ϑ̂
a,R
t ·∆Rt + ϑ̂
a,S
t ·∆St, t = 1, . . . , T,
are unique.
5 Base preferences and attainable initial endowments
In this section we consider the case where all agents have preferences of the same type and all en-
dowments can be attained by trading in the financial market. Then after hedging the endowment,
every agent invests in the same portfolio. If preferences are differentiable, the equilibrium pricing
kernel can be given in explicit form. In Subsection 5.1 we show our one-fund theorem. In Sub-
section 5.2 we discuss option prices under stochastic volatility, demand pressure and short-selling
constraints.
5.1 One-fund theorem
Note that mean-variance preferences of the form
MVγ(X) = E[X]− γVar(X)





for the functional MV = MV1. If the preferences of our agents are related in the same way to
a base preference functional and all initial endowments are attainable by trading, the following
holds:
Theorem 5.1 (One fund theorem)
Assume there exists an equilibrium such that (St)Tt=0 as well as all optimal one-step trading gains
ϑ̂
a,R
t ·∆Rt + ϑ̂
a,S
t ·∆St
are unique and the initial endowments are of the form
H





t ·∆Rt + η
a,S
t ·∆St,
for constants ca ∈ R and trading strategies (ηat )Tt=1, a ∈ A. Moreover, suppose there exist base
preference functionals
Ut : L
0(FT ) → L0(Ft), and non-empty subsets Ct+1 ∈ L0(Ft)J+K , t = 0, . . . , T − 1,








X) and Cat+1 =
1
γa
Ct+1 − ηat+1 (5.1)
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Then there exists a J-dimensional trading strategy (ϑ̂Rt )
T







s ·∆Rs + γ(n+ ηSs ) ·∆Ss
￿
(5.2)










∈ Cs, s = t + 1, . . . , T , and agent a’s optimal


















·∆St, t = 1, . . . , T. (5.3)









s ·∆Rs + γ(n+ ηSs ) ·∆Ss
￿
defines probability measures satisfying Qt |Ft= P |Ft such that
Rt = EQt [RT | Ft] and St = EQt [ST | Ft] for all t ≤ T − 1.
If moreover, U0 is strictly monotone, then Q := Q0 is equivalent to P, and one has
Rt = EQ [RT | Ft] as well as St = EQ [ST | Ft] for all t.
Remark 5.2 If under the assumptions of Theorem 5.1, there are no R-assets (J = 0) and the
endowments are of the form Ha = ca + ηa,S ·S for deterministic vectors ηa,S ∈ RK , one can write
H











·∆St, t = 1, . . . , T.
That is, after hedging the endowment, every agent, like in a one-time-step CAPM, takes a static
position in the market portfolio. Moreover, if U0 is strictly monotone and has the differentiability




γ(n+ ηS) · S
￿






Thus, the equilibrium pricing measure only depends on aggregate endowment and supply and
not on the distribution of wealth among the agents. Moreover, the introduction of new assets in
zero-net supply does not change existing security prices. Of course, the situation is different when
agents are truly heterogeneous or endowments are unspanned.
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Example 5.3 If the agents have entropic utility functionals
U
a
t (X) = −
1
γa
logE [exp(−γaX) | Ft] for constants γa > 0, a ∈ A,
one can write Uat (X) = Ut(γ
a
X)/γa for the base preference functionals
Ut(X) = − logE [exp(−X) | Ft] , t = 0, . . . , T.
We know from Example 2.1 that they have the properties (M), (T), (C), (TC) and U0 satisfies
(SL), (SM), (SC). Moreover, Ut has the differentiability property (D) with
∇Ut(X) =
exp(−X)
E [exp(−X) | Ft]
.
So if all agents are unconstrained and have endowments of the form
H





t ·∆Rt + η
a,S
t ·∆St,
one obtains from Theorem 3.4 that an equilibrium exists. By Propositions 4.2 and 4.4, the
equilibrium prices and optimal one-step trading gains are unique, and it follows from Theorem
5.1 that for γ = (
￿
a∈A(γ




t , there exists a J-dimensional trading
strategy (ϑ̂Rt )
T





























ϑ̂Rs ·∆Rs + γ(n+ ηSs ) ·∆Ss
￿￿￿
(5.4)
defines a probability measure Q equivalent to P for which
Rt = EQ [RT | Ft] and St = EQ [ST | Ft] for all t = 0, . . . , T.
For the special case where there are no R-assets (J = 0) and endowments are of the form Ha =
c





−γ(n+ ηS) · ST
￿







5.2 Simulation of option prices in a discrete Heston model
As an application of Theorem 5.1 we calculate equilibrium prices of equity options and study the
effects of stochastic volatility, demand pressure and short-selling constraints. It has been observed
that implied volatility smiles of index options and options on single stocks look differently even
though the underlying distributions are similar. Typically, index options appear to be more
expensive and their smiles are steeper. A possible explanation for this difference is that there
usually is positive aggregate demand for out-the-money put index options by end users. If option
dealers sell these options to end users and cannot fully hedge themselves, they expose themselves
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to the risk of a decline of the index. To compensate for that they are asking higher prices;
see Bakshi et al. (2003), Bollen and Whaley (2004), Gârleanu et al. (2009) and the references
therein. We follow Gârleanu et al. (2009) and assume our agents A are option dealers with
expected exponential utility preferences with absolute risk aversions γa > 0, a ∈ A. They have no
endowments and trade in the underlying and the options. On the other side there are end users
such as for instance, pension funds who buy put options to insure their investment portfolios.
We assume that end users demand a fixed portfolio of put options and pay the price at which it
is offered by the dealers. For our simulations we suppose they demand m ≥ 0 put options with
discounted strike K0 = 92 and maturity T . The net supply among the dealers is n = −m ≤ 0.
We assume the dealers do not influence the price of the underlying R but determine the option
prices. Suppose the underlying moves according to a discretized Heston model




t+h|, R0 = 100




t+h|, v0 = 0.04.
The absolute values are here to guarantee that Rt and vt stay above zero. We choose maturity
T = 0.5 years and make 100 steps of size h = 0.005. The other parameters are µ = 0.1, α = 0.2,






n=0 are two Bernoulli random walks with independent
increments that have distribution P[∆bit = ±
√







shall be interested in the prices of put options on R. The discounted time-T payoff corresponding
to discounted strike K and maturity T is S = (K − RT )+. While for the simulation of (Rt) we
make steps of size h = 0.005, we assume the trading dates to be a subset T of T = {0, h, . . . , T}
containing {0, T}. If T is coarse, option dealers can rebalance their portfolios less frequently, and
the model becomes more incomplete. We think of situations where transaction costs are high or
there are trading constraints. Denote by ΘRT the set of all investment strategies in the underlying
that are constant on the intervals [ti−1, ti), where T = {t0 = 0, t1, . . . , T}. By formula (5.4), the

















t ∆Rt − γnP
￿￿ ,
where γ = (
￿
a∈A(γ










t ∆Rt − γnP
￿￿
over the set ΘRT .
In the following we calculate implied volatilities of put options with discounted strikes between 85
and 115 for different choices of n and T. We first assume n = 0 (no demand pressure) and think
of R as the price of a single stock. The first of the two figures below shows implied volatilities
for the case n = 0 and T = T (option dealers rebalance their portfolios frequently). The second
figure shows the situation for n = 0 and T = {0, T} (option dealers have to form their portfolios
at time 0 and keep them constant until T ).
20


































For n = 0, trading restrictions increase implied volatilities, and therefore option prices, only
slightly because option dealers do not have to hedge the options. The only difference between fre-
quent and less frequent trading is the quality of the dealers’ investment strategy in the underlying
R.
Now assume that net demand by end users for put options with discounted strikeK0 is positive
and correspondingly, n < 0. This is typical for index options (see Gârleanu et al. (2009)). The
first of the following two figures shows implied volatilities for the case n < 0 (positive demand)
and T = T (dealers rebalance frequently). The second one is for n < 0 (positive demand) and
T = {0, T} (dealers have to invest statically).


































It can be seen that net demand for put options with discounted strike K0 = 92 increases prices
of put options of all strikes, but especially those corresponding to low strikes. Also, trading
restrictions have more of an influence on prices than in the case n = 0.
As a limit case, the next figure shows results for n < 0 and T = ∅. That is, there is positive
demand by end users for put options with discounted strikeK0. But option dealers are not allowed
to trade the underlying. This can be interpreted as short-selling constraints. If dealers are short
in put options, they would like to hedge by shorting the underlying. But under short-selling
constraints, the best they can do is to have a zero position in the underlying. This increases
prices of put options further compared to the case of demand pressure and few trading dates.
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See also Avellaneda and Lipkin (2009) for a continuous-time model for hard-to-borrow stocks and
the valuation of options on them.
6 Random walks and BS∆Es
We here consider the case where the noise is generated by d independent Bernoulli random walks
but in contrast to Subsection 5.2, agents can be heterogenous and random endowments unspanned.




t=0 can be obtained as solution to a
system of coupled BS∆Es (backward stochastic difference equations). For notational convenience
we restrict ourselves to the case J = K = 1, that is, R and S are both one-dimensional. The S-
asset is in net supply n ∈ R. We assume throughout this section that all agents are unconstrained,
U
a
0 is sensitive to large losses for all a ∈ A, and Uat satisfies the differentiability condition (D)
for all a ∈ A and t ≤ T − 1. We let the time between two successive trading periods be given
by some step size h > 0. The set of trading dates is T = {0, h, . . . , T}, where T = Nh for some
N ∈ N. Let bi = (bit)t∈T, i = 1, ..., d, be random walks starting at 0 such that the increments
∆bit+h = b
i




Let (Ft)t∈T be the filtration generated by (bit), i = 1, . . . , d. Note that Ft is generated by 2dt/h
atoms. In particular, L0(Ft) just contains bounded random variables and can be identified with
Rdt/h.
6.1 The predictable representation property
It is well-known that for d = 1, the random walk b has the predictable representation property
￿
x+ z∆bt+h : x, z ∈ L0(Ft)
￿
= L0(Ft+h) for all t ≤ T − h. (6.1)






i∆bit+h : x ∈ L0(Ft), z ∈ L0(Ft)d
￿
￿ L0(Ft+h) if d ≥ 2.
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However, the following result shows how the predictable representation property can be obtained
for d ≥ 2 by adding enough orthogonal Bernoulli random walks.3.
Lemma 6.1 There exist (Ft)-adapted random walks bd+1, . . . , bD for D = 2d − 1 such that
b
i
0 = 0 and P[∆bit+h = ±
√







= 0 for all 1 ≤ i ￿= l ≤ D
and ￿
x+ z ·∆bt+h : x ∈ L0(Ft), z ∈ L0(Ft)D
￿
= L0(Ft+h),
where b is the D-dimensional random walk with components bi, i = 1, . . . , D.
It follows from Lemma 6.1 that every X ∈ L0(Ft+h) can be written as











, i = 1, . . . , D.
So one obtains from the translation property of the mappings Uat that
U
a
t (X) = U
a
t (E [X|Ft] + πt(X) ·∆bt+h) = E [X | Ft]− fat (πt(X))h, (6.2)
where fat : L
0(Ft)D → L0(Ft) is the Ft-convex function given by
f
a





















￿ ·∆bt+h∇Uat (z ·∆bt+h) | Ft
￿
= z￿ · 1
h










= z￿ ·∇fat (z)
for the random vector
∇fat (z) = E [−∆bt+h∇Uat (z ·∆bt+h) | Ft] ∈ L0(Ft)D.
3Since the newly introduced random walks are adapted to the original filtration, they do not change the infor-
mation structure of the economy
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6.2 First order conditions and equilibrium dynamics
We know from Theorem 3.4 that an equilibrium exists, and by Proposition 4.2, the equilibrium
price process (St)t∈T is unique. Introduce the random vectors
Z
R
t+h := πt(Rt+h), Z
S























































So optimal trading strategies ϑ̂at+h have to satisfy the following first order conditions:





































t+h + xSt+h | Ft
￿
− ft(xZSt+h, Zt+h)h (6.5)
for the function ft : L0(Ft)(3+|A|)D → L0(Ft) given by the convolution




























Furthermore, one has the following result:





















As a consequence one obtains from (6.3)–(6.4) the two equations















Since ∇vft also depends on Zat+h, a ∈ A, one needs the dynamics of the processes (Hat ), a ∈ A,





















+ ϑ̂a,Rt+hE [∆Rt+h | Ft] + ϑ̂
a,S

















































































equations (6.9) and (6.10) yield the following result:












t+h ·∆bt+h, HaT = Ha. (6.12)
Remark 6.4 If in equilibrium the market becomes complete, the system of BS∆Es (6.11)–(6.12)










= ηa,Rt+h(Rt+h − E [Rt+h | Ft]) + η
a,S
t+h(St+h − E [St+h | Ft]),






















− ϑa,1E [∆Rt+h | Ft]
h
.
In particular, ∇vft(nZSt+h, Zt+h) does not depend on Zat+h, a ∈ A, and equation (6.11) decouples
from (6.12).
We refer to Horst and Müller (2007) and Horst et al. (2010) for sufficient conditions for
market completeness in continuous-time and characterization of equilibrium by BSDEs (backward
stochastic differential equations). Results on market completeness in more general equilibrium
models can be found in Magill and Shafer (1990) and Anderson and Raimondo (2009).
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6.3 Example with entropic preferences
We now study a concrete example where the agents have entropic preferences. For small time
steps h, one can approximate fat with quadratic drivers, and (6.11)–(6.12) becomes a coupled
system of BS∆Es with drivers of quadratic growth. We first derive explicit expressions for the
approximate equilibrium dynamics in discrete time. Then we give a formal discussion of the
continuous-time limit h ↓ 0.
6.3.1 Approximate dynamics in discrete time
Assume (Rt) evolves according to
∆Rt+h = Rt(µh+ σ∆b
1
t+h), R0 ∈ R+, (6.13)





h. Then (Rt) satisfies the no-arbitrage condition (NA) from above. The random vec-
tor ZRt is given by Z
R
t = (σRt, 0, . . . , 0) and cannot vanish. Suppose the agents have entropic
preferences of the form
U
a
t (X) = −
1
γa
logE [exp(−γaX) | Ft] for constants γa > 0, a ∈ A.






logE [exp(−γaz ·∆bt+h)] .
This expression is not very convenient for calculations. But for small time steps h, it can be ap-
proximated by a quadratic function. The idea is to ignore the orthogonal random walks bd+1, ..., bD
and approximate fat by a polynomial in z. To do that, let us write z ∈ L0(Ft)D as z = (z̄, z̃) for
z̄ ∈ L0(Ft)d and z̃ ∈ L0(Ft)D−d. For X ∈ L0(FT ) and small h > 0,
X = E [X] +
￿
t<T




is a good approximation which in the limit h ↓ 0 becomes X = E [X] +
￿ T
0 Zt · dBt for a d-
dimensional Brownian motion (Bt)0≤t≤T and a predictable process (Zt)0≤t≤T . We therefore ne-































































note that using approximation (6.14), the first order conditions (6.3)–(6.4) become









































































− (zA,1t+h + nz
S,1
t+h).
So one obtains from (6.18)
g
S










where zA,lt+h and z
S,l
t+h are the vectors consisting of the last d − 1 components of zAt+h and zSt+h,
respectively.
With the approximation (6.14) the drivers gat take the form
g
a





￿zat+h + ϑ1zRt+h + ϑ2zSt+h￿22 − ϑ1µRt − ϑ2gSt (zt+h), (6.19)











t+h ·∆b̄t+h, HaT = Ha. (6.21)
In particular, they can be computed recursively by solving the following equations:
St = E[St+h | Ft]− gSt (zt+h)h, ST = S (6.22)
H
a
t = E[Hat+h | Ft]− gat (zt+h)h, HaT = Ha. (6.23)



































t+h · zRt+h, cRSt+h := zRt+h · zSt+h, cSat+h := zSt+h · zat+h, etc.




t+h − cRSt+hcRSt+h > 0. This condition means that from t to t + h the two assets
are non-redundant. So ϑ̂R,at+h and ϑ̂
S,a


























t+h−cRSt+hcRSt+h = 0. In this case one of the two assets is redundant in equilibrium,













To realistically simulate the system (6.22)–(6.23) is a non-trivial numerical task and left for future
research.
6.3.2 Continuous-time limit
Let (Bt)0≤t≤T be a d-dimensional Brownian motion and denote by (Ft) the augmented filtration
generated by (Bt). Let (Rt) be a financial asset whose price is exogenously given by
dRt = Rt(µdt+ σdB
1
t ), R0 ∈ R+,
where µ, σ, r0 are positive constants and B1 is the first component of the Brownian motion B.
Additionally, there exists an instrument with final payoff S ∈ L∞(FT ) that is traded by agents
a ∈ A with initial endowments Ha ∈ L∞(FT ) and preferences of the form
U
a
t (X) = −
1
γa
logE [exp(−γaX) | Ft] , γa > 0.













t · dBt, HaT = Ha (6.26)

























where ZA,lt and Z
S,l









￿Zat + ϑ1ZRt + ϑ2ZSt ￿22 − ϑ1µRt − ϑ2gSt (Zt). (6.27)
As in discrete time, optimal strategies (ϑ̂a,Rt , ϑ̂
a,S
t ) must minimize (6.27) for all t.
At this time there exists no general result which guarantees existence or uniqueness of solutions
to the coupled system of BSDEs (6.25)–(6.26). So it is currently a conjecture that there exist
processes (St), (Hat ), (Zt) solving (6.25)–(6.26) and that (St) is an equilibrium price.
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A Proofs of Section 2
Proof of (2.12)
Let X ∈ L0(Ft+1) and introduce the Ft-measurable sets
A0 = {P[X ≤ 0 | Ft] > 0} , Al = {P[X ≤ l | Ft] > 0 and P[X ≤ l − 1 | Ft] = 0} for l ≥ 1.






P[X ≤ l | Ft]
is in Dt+1, and one has
E [([X ∧ n] ∨m)ξ +G(ξ) | Ft] ≤
￿
l∈N
1Al (l + E [G(ξ) | Ft]) < ∞
for all n ∈ N and m ∈ −N. This shows (2.12). ￿
Proof of (2.13)
Let X ∈ L0(Ft+1) such that P[X < 0] > 0. We first show that for every n ∈ N, there exists a
constant λt ≥ 1 such that
P[Vt(λtX) ≤ −n] > 0. (A.1)




P[X < 0 | Ft]
+ 1Ac ∈ Dt+1.
The claim (A.1) now follows from the fact that
1AVt(λtX) ≤ 1A (E [λtXξ +G(ξ) | Ft]) → −∞1A as λt → ∞.
So one obtains that for every n ∈ N there exist constants λt−1,λt ≥ 1 such that
P[Vt−1 (λt−1Vt(λtX)) ≤ −n] > 0.
By concavity of Vt, one has
Vt(λt−1λtX) ≤ λt−1Vt (λtX) ,
and it follows that
P [Vt−1(λt−1λtX) ≤ −n] ≥ P [Vt−1(λt−1Vt(λtX)) ≤ −n] > 0
for all λt−1 and λt sufficiently large. Iterating this argument yields (2.13). ￿
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B Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.1




t=1, a ∈ A,
form an equilibrium. Then condition (iii) holds by definition. Moreover, the associated continu-
ation value processes (Hat ) are bounded from below and one obtains
−û∗t (St) = ess sup
x∈L0(Ft)K






















































− n · St
≤ ût(n)− n · St. (B.1)
Since ût(n) + û∗t (St) ≤ n · St, the inequality in (B.1) must be an equality, and it follows that
















which shows that conditions (i) and (ii) hold.
For the reverse implication, assume that (i)–(iii) are satisfied. Then the market clearing
condition holds, and one has for all admissible trading strategies (ϑat )
T





















t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑ
a,S



























t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑ̂
a,S
t+1 ·∆St+1).
From here it follows by backwards induction that (ϑ̂at )
T
t=1 is an optimal strategy for each agent
a ∈ A. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Suppose there exists no probability measure Q equivalent to P which satisfies (3.5). Then it follows
from the Dalang–Morton–Willinger theorem (Dalang et al. 1990) that there exists a t ≤ T − 1
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and a one-step trading strategy ϑt+1 ∈ L0(Ft)J+K such that ϑRt+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑSt+1 ·∆St+1 is non-
negative and strictly positive with positive probability. The same is true for εt(ϑRt+1 · ∆Rt+1 +
ϑ
S
t+1 ·∆St+1) for arbitrary Ft-measurable εt > 0. But this means that there can exist no optimal
trading strategies for the agents with strictly monotone preference functionals and open trading
constraints, a contradiction to the assumption that the market is in equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Theorem 3.4
Set ST = S and HaT = H
a, a ∈ A. Then existence of an equilibrium follows from Theorem 3.1 if we
can show that for every t ≤ T − 1, St+1 ∈ L∞(Ft+1)K and bounded from below Hat+1 ∈ L0(Ft+1),
a ∈ A, the following hold:














t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑ̂
a,S
t+1 · St+1) = ût(n)
(b) there exists St ∈ ∂ût(n) ∩ L∞(Ft)K .
(a) follows from Lemma B.1 below and (b) will be shown in Lemma B.2. To prove Lemmas B.1
and B.2, we need the following concepts from Cheridito et al. (2011):
We call a subset C of L0(F)d F-linear if
λx+ y ∈ C
for all x, y ∈ L0(F)d and λ ∈ L0(F). We call C F-convex if
λx+ (1− λ)y ∈ C




x ∈ L0(F)d : x · ai ≤ αi, i = 1, . . . , I
￿
for random vectors a1, . . . , aI ∈ L0(F)d and α1, . . . ,αI ∈ L0(F). A mapping f : L0(F)d →
L
0(F)m is F-linear if
f(λx+ y) = λf(x) + f(y)
for all x, y ∈ L0(F)d and λ ∈ L0(F). If m = 1, we say f is F-convex (F-concave) if
f(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ (≥)λf(x) + (1− λ)f(y)
for all x, y ∈ L0(F)d and λ ∈ L0(F) satisfying 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. By N(F) we denote the set of all F-
measurable random variables taking values in N = {1, 2, ...}. For a sequence (xm)m∈N in L0(F)d
and M ∈ N(F), we define xM :=
￿
m∈N 1{M=m}xm.
Lemma B.1 Let t ≤ T − 1, St+1 ∈ L∞(Ft+1)K and Hat+1 ∈ L0(Ft+1), a ∈ A, all bounded
from below. Assume the sets Cat+1, a ∈ A, factorize and are sequentially closed. If there exists a
(possibly empty) subset A￿ ⊂ A such that
(i) Ua0 is sensitive to large losses for all a ∈ A￿ and
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(ii) Cat+1 is Ft-bounded for all a ∈ A \ A￿,
then ût(x) < ∞ for all x ∈ L0(Ft)K , the set
Θ =
￿
x ∈ L0(F)K : ût(x) ∈ L0(Ft)
￿

















































t+1) ⊂ Θ̃ :=
￿
x ∈ L0(F)K : ût(x) > −∞
￿
,







On the other hand, it follows from the definition of ût that for every x ∈ Θ̃, there exists a sequence






n = x on the set An \An−1, where A0 = ∅.







n belongs to C
a













polyhedral, it follows from Cheridito et al. (2011) that Θ̃ is again Ft-polyhedral. By condition
(C1), n belongs to Θ̃. So if we can show (B.2) for all x ∈ Θ̃, it follows that Θ̃ = Θ, and the lemma
is proved.
To do this, fix x ∈ Θ̃. Since the price process (Rt)Tt=0 satisfies (NA), one obtains from the
Dalang–Morton–Willinger theorem (Dalang et al. 1990) that there exists an equivalent martingale
measure Q ∼ P such that Rt = EQ [Rt+1 | Ft]. Set W = St+1−EQ [St+1 | Ft]. There exist one-step
















a,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W
￿
and B is the Ft-polyhedral set
B :=
￿












Introduce the Ft-linear set
E :=
￿
θ ∈ L0(Ft)(J+K) : θR ·∆Rt+1 + θS ·W = 0
￿
and denote by Π the Ft-conditional projection from L0(Ft)|A|(J+K) to (E⊥)|A
￿|×L0(Ft)|A\A
￿|(J+K).








a,S = x. Then the Ft-convex set
C := {η ∈ Π(B) : g(η) ≥ g(η)}




has one. Next we show that C is Ft-bounded. If C contains only elements η = (ηa)a∈A such that
η
a = 0 for all a ∈ A￿, then this is a direct consequence of the assumption that Cat+1 is Ft-bounded
for all a ∈ A \ A￿. On the other hand, if C contains an element η = (ηa)a∈A such that ηa ￿= 0 for
some a ∈ A￿, then there exists a set A ∈ Ft with P[A] > 0 and a non-empty subset A￿￿ of A￿ such
that
P[ηa,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W ￿= 0 | Ft] > 0 on A for all a ∈ A￿￿
and
η
a,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W = 0 on A for all a ∈ A￿ \ A￿￿
Since ∆Rt+1 and W satisfy the no-arbitrage condition (NA), P[ϑa,R ·∆Rt+1 + ϑa,S ·W < 0 | Ft]
must be strictly positive on A for all a ∈ A￿￿. So it follows from the sensitivity to large losses of












a,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W
￿￿
→ −∞ almost surely on A for all a ∈ A￿￿.
(B.4)















a,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W
￿￿
> −∞ almost surely on A￿.














a,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W
￿￿
≥ c almost surely on A￿￿ .
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a,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W
￿￿
≥ c− 1 on A￿￿.










a,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W
￿￿
≥ c− 1 on A￿￿ ∩ {l ≥ M1} for all l ∈ N. (B.5)
Choose l0 ∈ N such that P[A￿￿￿] > 0 for A￿￿￿ = A￿￿∩{l0 ≥ M1}. Since Hat+1 is bounded from below,
there exists m ∈ N such that
P[1A￿￿￿((Hat+1)+ +m(ηa,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W )) < 0] > 0.

















+ +m(ηa,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W )
￿￿
















a,R ·∆Rt+1 + ηa,S ·W ))
￿
→ −∞ for l → ∞.
But this contradicts (B.5). So (B.4) must be true. Since g(η) ∈ L0(Ft), it follows that there
exists an m ∈ N such that mη /∈ C. Hence, we obtain from Cheridito et al. (2011) that C is
Ft-bounded and there exists a ϑ ∈ C such that




Lemma B.2 Under the assumptions of Lemma B.1 there exists a random vector St in ∂ût(n) ∩
L
∞(Ft)K .
Proof. It follows from Lemma B.1 that ût(n) ∈ L0(Ft). In the next step we show that





. To do that let x ∈ L0(Ft)K such that ût(n+x) > −∞ (inequal-
ity (B.6) holds trivially on the event {ût(n+ x) = −∞}). By Lemma B.1, there exist one-step





















Since the sets Cat+1 factorize and there exist one-step strategies ϑ̂
a































t+1 ) = sign(x
















































and one obtains (B.6).




It follows from (B.6) and Ft-concavity that
L||x||Ft ≥ p(x) ≥ ût(n+ x)− ût(n).
In particular, p maps L0(Ft)K to L0(Ft) and it is enough to show that there exists y ∈ L∞(Ft)K
such that
x · y ≥ p(x) for all x ∈ L0(Ft)K . (B.7)
Note that p satisfies
p(λx) = λp(x) for all x ∈ L0(Ft)K and λ ∈ L0+(Ft) (B.8)
p(x+ z) ≥ p(x) + p(z) for all x, z ∈ L0(Ft)K . (B.9)
In particular,
p(1Ax) = 1Ap(x) for all A ∈ Ft and x ∈ L0(Ft)K (B.10)
and
0 ≥ p(x) + p(−x) for all x ∈ L0(Ft)K . (B.11)
Denote
α = ess sup
x∈L0(Ft)K , ||x||Ft=1
p(x) ≤ L.
It follows from (B.10) that there exists a sequence (xm)m∈N in L0(Ft)K such that ||xm||Ft = 1
and p(xm) ↑ α almost surely. It follows from Cheridito et al. (2011) that there exists a sequence
(Mm)m∈N in N(Ft) such that Mm+1 ≥ Mm ≥ m for all m ∈ N and xMm → z almost surely
for some z ∈ L0(Ft)K with ||z||Ft = 1. One deduces from the fact that Θ is Ft-polyhedral that
p(z) = α. So z is a direction of steepest ascent for the function p at 0. The random vector
y = α+z
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satisfies ||y||Ft ≤ L. It remains to show that it fulfills (B.7). It clearly does so on the set {α ≤ 0}.
So to finish the proof, we can assume that P[α > 0] = 1. The subset
E =
￿
λz : λ ∈ L0(Ft)
￿
⊂ L0(Ft)K
is Ft-linear and Ft-closed. So it follows from Cheridito et al. (2011) that
L
0(Ft)K = E + E⊥ and E ∩ E⊥ = {0}




x ∈ L0(Ft)K : x · v = 0 for all v ∈ E
￿
.
If we can show that
p(λz + x) ≤ λp(z) for all λ ∈ L0(Ft) and x ∈ E⊥, (B.12)
it follows that
p(λz + x) ≤ λα ≤ (λz + x) · y for all λ ∈ L0(Ft) and x ∈ E⊥,
and the proof is complete. By (B.8) and (B.10), inequality (B.12) follows if we can show it for
the three special cases λ = 0, λ = 1 and λ = −1. If λ = 0, it is enough to show that
p(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ E⊥ such that ||x||Ft = 1. (B.13)
Assume by way of contraction that there exists an x ∈ E⊥ such that ||x||Ft = 1 and P[p(x) >









1− λ2p(x) > p(z)








1− λ2x||Ft = 1, this contradicts the fact that z is a direction of steepest ascent
of p at 0. So (B.13) must be true. Next, note that for all x ∈ E⊥,
p(z + x)− p(z) ≤ lim
m→∞










p(z + x) ≤ p(z).
Finally, assume there exists an x ∈ E⊥ such that P[p(−z + x) > −p(z)] > 0. Then one has
p(x/2) ≥ p(−z + x) + p(z)
2
> 0
on the set {p(−z + x) > −p(z)}. But this contradicts (B.13). So (B.12) is proved. ￿
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C Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Suppose there exists an equilibrium price process (St)Tt=0 and equilibrium trading strategies
(ϑ̂at )
T












t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑSt+1 ·∆St+1
￿
over all ϑt+1 ∈ Cat+1. Fix j ∈ {1, . . . , J} and choose an Ft-measurable random variable ε > 0 such
that ϑ̂at+1 + εe









t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑ̂
a,S










t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑ̂
a,S
t+1 ·∆St+1 + ε∆R
j
t+1/m)− Uat (Hat+1 + ϑ̂
a,R


















t+1 ·∆Rt+1 + ϑ̂
a,S
t+1 ·∆St+1) | Ft
￿
,










∇̃Uas (Has+1 + ϑ̂
a,R
s+1 ·∆Rs+1 + ϑ̂
a,S



































































The second equality is a consequence of the definition of the process (Hat )
T
t=0, the third holds
because Uas and U
a
s+1 have the translation property (T), and the fourth one follows from formula
































s ·∆Rs + ϑ̂a,Ss ·∆Ss
￿
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defines a probability measure Qa follows from the fact that Uat has the properties (M) and (T).









r ·∆Rr + ϑ̂a,Sr ·∆Sr
￿
> 0.
So Qa = Qa0 is equivalent to P and one obtains (4.5). ￿
Proof of Proposition 4.4






t=1 for agent a and
a time s such that
ϑ̂
a,R
s ·∆Rs + ϑ̂a,Ss ·∆Ss ￿= ϑa,Rs ·∆Rs + ϑa,Ss ·∆Ss. (C.1)









t if t ￿= s
ϑ
a
t if t = s
is again optimal. The two sides of (C.1) cannot differ only by a constant, for otherwise one of the








































a contradiction to the optimality of (ϑ̂at )
T
t=1. ￿
D Proofs of Section 5 and 6
Proof of Theorem 5.1
By assumption, there exist optimal admissible trading strategies (ϑ̂at )
T
t=1 for all agents a ∈ A, and
the optimal one-step trading gains
ϑ̂
a,R
t ·∆Rt + ϑ̂
a,S
t ·∆St, t ≥ 1,
are unique. Since Cat+1 = Ct+1/γ
a − ηat+1, the strategy ϑ̃at+1 := γa(ϑ̂at+1 + ηat+1) belongs to Ct+1




















t ·∆Rt + ϑ̃
a,S
t ·∆St = ϑ̃
b,R
t ·∆Rt + ϑ̃
b,S
t ·∆St for all a, b ∈ A and t ≥ 1.







































s ·∆Rs + ϑSs ·∆Ss
￿
for all t ≥ 1. This shows (5.2) and (5.3) because Ut is of the form Ut(X) = γaUat (X/γa).
The rest of the theorem follows from Proposition 4.2 by noting that if Ut satisfies (D) for all





























s ·∆Rs + ϑ̂a,Ss ·∆Ss
￿
for all a ∈ A. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6.1











= 0 for all 1 ≤ i ￿= l ≤ D, (D.2)
and ￿
x+ z ·∆bt+h : x ∈ L0(Ft), z ∈ L0(Ft)D
￿
= L0(Ft+h). (D.3)





∆bih, i = 1, . . . , d.
The σ-algebra σ(X1, . . . , Xd) is generated by the 2d atoms
￿
X
1 = ±1, . . . , Xd = ±1
￿
. Let us
denote them by A1, . . . , A2d . There are D = 2




I is a non-empty subset of {1, . . . , d}. X1, . . . , Xd are d of them. Let us denote the remaining
ones by Xd+1, . . . , XD. Each Xi can only take the values ±1, and one obtains by symmetry that
P[Xi = ±1] = 1/2 for all i = 1, . . . , D. (D.4)
Moreover,
E [XmXn] = 0 for all m ￿= n. (D.5)
This holds because Xm =
￿
i∈I X
i and Xn =
￿
j∈J X
j , where I and J are two different non-
empty subsets of {1, . . . , d}. Therefore, there exists an i which is in I but not in J or the other
way around. It then follows by independence that
















(D.4) and (D.5) show that 1, X1, . . . , XD are orthogonal. So they span the 2d-dimensional space of
all σ(X1, . . . , Xd)-measurable random variables
￿￿2d
i=1 λ
i1Ai : λ ∈ R2
d
￿




i = d+ 1, . . . , D, then (D.1)–(D.3) are satisfied. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6.2
For every Y ∈ L0(Ft)D and m ∈ N, one has
ft(nZ
S
















































t+h + Y/m,Zt+h)− ft(nZSt+h, Zt+h)
￿


















But since ft is conditionally convex in v, the lim sup is a lim and the inequality an equality. This
shows that ∇vft(nZSt+h, Zt+h) exists and is equal to (6.7). ￿
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